Via Teleconference
11:04 A.M. EST
MODERATOR: Thank you so much. And good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining us for the National Security Council background briefing on the launch of two executive orders the President has signed that focus on transnational organized crime and counternarcotics.
Some ground rules before we dive right in: This call will be on background, attributable to “senior administration officials.” The call will be embargoed until 2:00 p.m. Eastern this afternoon. And when the call concludes, I’ll be sending a factsheet to everyone who RSVPed on the upcoming actions.
Not for attribution but just for everyone’s awareness on the call, our first speaker is going to be [senior administration official]. After that, we will hear from [senior administration official] and [senior administration official]. We also have [senior administration official] on the line to answer questions.
With that, I’ll turn it over to our first speaker. [Senior administration official] will give you a preview of the two executive orders.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much. And thanks to everyone for joining today to hear about how the Biden-Harris administration is focused on countering transnational organized crime.
The U.S. Strategy on Countering Corruption, which was released just last week, and the Summit for Democracy, which was held just last week, both highlighted the importance of addressing the nexus between corruption and transnational criminal activity as a key national security priority.
The broad scope of illicit activities that are carried out by transnational criminal organizations — including drug and weapons trafficking, illicit finance, intellectual property theft, illegal mining, human trafficking, cybercrime, wildlife and timber trafficking, and more — directly threatens American lives. This scope of illicit activities also destabilizes key partner nations by undermining the rule of law, by facilitating corruption, and by increasing violence.
Countering these criminal actors and their enablers is a national security priority that demands a government-wide approach. That’s why today we are proud to announce the release of two new executive orders: one to establish the U.S. Council on Transnational Organized Crime — or “USCTOC,” as you’ll hear us refer to it — and two, to impose sanctions on foreign persons involved in the global illicit drug trade.
Let me start with USCTOC.
` Combatting transnational organized crime requires a government-wide approach. (Inaudible.) This executive order establishes the council, which includes leaders of the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The council is charged with ensuring that the U.S. government deploys a comprehensive approach and effectively leverages all appropriate tools to counter and address the threats posed by transnational criminal organizations.
This council represents an enhancement, a restructuring, and a replacement of the Threat Mitigation Working Group, which previously led government-wide lines of effort to counter transnational organized crime under Executive Order 13773, which was issued in February 2017.
And in a minute, I’m going to turn things over to a colleague, [senior administration official], to talk a bit more about this restructuring effort.
The Strategic Division, a key arm of the USCTOC, is responsible for developing government-wide plans to advance policy priorities established by the President, to address the top transnational organized crime threats. And this is especially critical in today’s operating environment as we work to counter transnational criminal organizations that increasingly operate all over the world.
That brings me to the second executive order being released today, which creates a new sanctions authority to target foreign individuals involved in the global illicit drug trade through sanctions and through related actions. This EO creates a new authority that extends beyond the existing Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions by allowing us to better target and disrupt activities across the full illicit drug ecosystem.
So this new authority provides an impactful and flexible tool for the U.S. government to counter narcotics trafficking and to disrupt cartels and their enablers and financial facilitators.
Stepping back for a moment here. Over 100,000 Americans died from drug overdoses in the 12 months leading up to April 2021. That’s the most ever recorded in a single year. To put that in some perspective, this correlates to one American overdose death approximately every five minutes, or more than one Boeing 757 crashing every single day.
All of this robs us of loved ones and leaves holes in the hearts of families in communities across this country.
The Biden-Harris administration is committed to using all appropriate tools to counter this flow of illicit drugs into American communities. This threat is one of many illicit activities in which transnational criminal organizations are engaged that these two new and important executive orders will seek to address.
And now let me turn things over to [senior administration official] to provide more background on USCTOC.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: [Senior administration official], thank you for that overview of the USCTOC.
The Strategic Division is the operational arm of the USCTOC responsible for developing whole-of-government plans to advance the President’s policy priorities by combatting top transnational organized crime threats. As [senior administration official] said earlier, this is especially critical in today’s operating environment as we work to counter a vast spectrum of transnational criminal organizations that operate all over the globe.
Today’s TCOs are responsible for killing tens of thousands of Americans every year, harming local communities, driving regional instability, and enabling the malign activities of hostile foreign powers.
Motivated by profit, power, and political influence, transnational criminal organizations weaken our allies and partners too by corrupting and undermining democratic institutions. They exploit weak governments in countries around the world, leading to national security threats here at home.
In addition, some state adversaries use transnational criminal organizations as instruments of national power, offering them territorial sanctuary where they are free to conduct unattributable cyber intrusions, sabotage, theft, and political subversion.
Now more than ever, the counter transnational organized crime mission requires cooperation across the law enforcement, intelligence, military, diplomatic, and economic communities.
Through the USCTOC, individual department and agency actions will be more strategically aligned and coordinated to overcome organizational barriers and support integrated action. This structure supports departments and agencies in collaboratively and jointly identifying, interdicting, disrupting, and dismantling transnational organizations crime networks and their support infrastructures.
The USCTOC Strategic Division is charged with ensuring that integrated planning is thoughtful, effective, and appropriately scoped to support the administration’s policy priorities. The USCTOC Strategic Division will be — will establish a consistent and reliable national-level strategic planning capability to improve our ability to work together to combat TCOs at home and abroad.
Among the policy priorities that USCTOC has already marshalled U.S. government resources to support is in targeting transnational criminal organizations trafficking in fentanyl, methamphetamines, precursor and essential chemicals flowing into the United States and fueling the opioid epidemic.
The new USCTOC will enable U.S. agencies and foreign partners to assume the strategic offensive, denying TCOs the ability to harm Americans by targeting their leadership and their illicit support infrastructure in depth.
We will assist countries, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, to break the corruptive power of these organizations and networks, restore the rule of law, regional stability, good governance and prosperity.
And with that, I’ll pass it over to my colleague, [senior administration official] to talk about the Treasury.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much, [senior administration official]. I appreciate that.
Again, my name is [senior administration official].
Today, President Biden signed a new executive order to modernize the Department of Treasury sanctions authorities used to combat the illicit drug trade.
Under the new EO, the Office of Foreign Assets Control announced the designations of 25 targets today — 10 individuals and 15 entities.
The action targets an array of illicit actors involved in the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production. Five of these actors are based in China and are engaged in either trafficking fentanyl or other synthetic drugs to the United States or in the export of various precursor chemicals essential to the production of fentanyl.
In Brazil, Primeiro Comando da Capital — also known as “PCC” — is among the most powerful organized crime groups and traffickers of illicit drugs in South America.
While drug trafficking is the PCC’s main business, it’s also involved in money laundering, extortion, murder-for-hire, and drug debt collection. It also operates throughout South America, and its financial networks stretch all the way to the United States, Europe, Africa, and Asia.
Seven targets designated today are Mexican nationals, all of whom are directly or indirectly linked to the trafficking of deadly drugs, including fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine to the United States.
As a result of today’s action, Treasury designated all nine Mexican drug trafficking organizations identified by the Drug Enforcement Administration as having the greatest drug trafficking impact on the United States.
Today’s designations with the new EO underscores the Biden-Harris administration’s commitment to tackling our nation’s overdose epidemic by holding accountable those participating in and benefiting from the trafficking of synthetic opioids and other illicit drugs.
To date, the vast majority of counter narcotics sanctions designations have been implemented under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act — or the “Kingpin Act” — which is a statute enacted almost 20 years ago.
In the last two decades, however, the nature of drug trafficking has changed dramatically.
Illicit drugs are more potent, addictive, and deadly, and able kill in mass numbers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the skyrocketing death rate from synthetic opioids.
Today’s drug trade no longer rely on crops or require vast acreage, but instead on synthetic materials and precursor chemicals.
Cartels operate in a more diffuse and decentralized way, hindering their ability to build — hindering our ability to build comprehensive sanctions packages on drug traffickers — the facilitation networks — using the traditional “Kingpin” model.
Therefore, the Treasury Department worked with other U.S. agencies and developed an executive order that reflects the new realities of the 21st century drug trade.
This new EO allows Treasury, in consultation with other U.S. government agencies, to target any foreign person engaged in drug trafficking activities regardless of their significance or whether they are linked to a specific kingpin or cartel.
The EO also authorizes sanctions against foreign persons who knowingly receive property that constitutes or is derived from proceeds of illicit drug trafficking activities.
The EO authorizes Treasury to block the property of persons, as is the norm for most sanctions EOs, but it also has an additional menu of nonblocking sanctions.
This menu largely consists of various prohibitions on certain transactions involving the sanctioned person, but also includes the ability to suspend a person’s entry into the United States.
This EO will build on previous narcotics authorities in order to expose, isolate, and disrupt international drug trafficking organizations, their leaders, support networks, and the entire illicit drug ecosystem.
Criminal production and trafficking of synthetic opioids have claimed the lives of tens of thousands of Americans and have negatively impacted the United States economy and its productivity.
The new EO will give Treasury greater flexibility, speed, and power to sanction those within the global drug trade.
Finally, today’s EO and our designations reflect the Treasury Department’s vision to ensure the warranted, strategic, and judicious use of sanctions.
At this time, I’ll turn it back to my colleague. Thank you very much.
MODERATOR: Thank you so much. And with that, we’re ready to open it up for Q&A.
Q Hi. Thank you for doing this. I have a question. The previous administration made a point of singling out Venezuela as one of the places that were sending the most drugs towards the United States. There were some indictments too. And they even identified a cartel that was going through other — like, Central America. They even went to the point last year of like deploying naval forces around the Pacific and Caribbean.
I wanted to know if any of these measures are going to be linked to countering these drug trafficking from the Venezuelan government and those routes that were singled out by the previous administration in 2020. Thank you so much.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Hey, I’m happy to jump in on that. And then see if perhaps my colleague wants to add anything.
I think what I’d say is, stepping back a bit, that the whole goal here is to do two things, really: one, obviously update our authorities in this area to be more nimble, but, two, to do so in a way that recognizes the way in which these threats transcend national boundaries and are global in nature. And of course, ultimately, with a focus on how that permeates and penetrates American communities — leading to victims and to violence, but also to similar problems and corruption abroad.
So, I’d say, at the level of these executive orders today, our goal is really to capture this problem in a global framework and with a recognition of the transnational nature and increasingly network nature of those who pose these type of threats.
But let me kick it to my colleague to see if there’s anything he’d like to add.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. Appreciate that. I agree with everything you said at this point.
As far as using our narcotic sanctions authorities with respect to Venezuela, first of all, we obviously would not comment on prospective targets that we would look at for sanctions.
But as many of you know, Venezuela — you know, individuals within Venezuela, including the government, have been the target of past Treasury Department sanctions for narcotics trafficking. But I wouldn’t want to venture out to say how this new Treasury executive order will be used against any specific country at this point.
I would simply say that we simply follow the evidence of the drug trade to identify our targets.
Q Hi, thank you for doing this. When it comes to drug trafficking, the U.S. has always highlighted the role of the Central American countries — Honduras, for example.
I would like to know how this executive order targets those countries and how it goes the same time with the strategy to combat corruption and the root causes of migration from Central America.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks, George, for the question. And then maybe I’ll again say an initial word and then also invite my colleague to chime in.
So again, in terms of the executive orders themselves, they are by design global in their reach, global in nature, and in some ways built to address these problems as we find them increasingly dispersed around the world and it’s increasingly interconnected across national boundaries.
Of course, as you say, with respect to the Western Hemisphere, this administration has pursued efforts to address corruption, to ensure that migration management is safe, orderly, and humane. And all of this is meant to be reinforcing and we hope will be increasingly reinforcing as we implement it.
Because, as you heard me emphasize before, not only do the challenges that these EOs are designed to help us address wreak havoc in American communities, but they do the same for partners abroad, especially on the corruption issue that you emphasize, but also at the level of violence and at the level of criminal activity.
And so, we do this in our own hemisphere in an interconnected way that links up to that root cause of strategy into our other work in the region that you mentioned. But of course, these two EOs are designed to be inherently global in nature.
Do you want to build on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, thank you.
Yeah, I think this is precisely why we developed this new executive order, because the nature of the drug trade and transnational criminal organizations have really transformed over the last 20 years or so.
So today, the executive order for sanctions permits us to target criminal organizations who are involved not only in drug trafficking, but other transnational crimes, whether it’s, you know, human smuggling, human trafficking, firearms driving, things of this sort.
And we’re increasingly seeing that a lot of the drug trafficking organizations take on these other criminal activities because they control large swaths of territory. So that’s one of the new dynamics.
Now, the individual did speak of certain Central American countries. We have built strong partnerships with the Northern Triangle countries. We intend to use this in cooperation with those countries as well as we have throughout the past.
So I’ll just — I’ll just stop it right there. But I hope this addressed your question. Thank you.
Q Hi, thank you. I wanted to ask a little bit more about the sanctions. I’m curious if the change here involves the ability to be able to sanction specific people. Do the sanctions have to be tied with potential criminal charges?
And then, also, if you could talk a little bit about like whether or not the sanctions can go above the TCOs themselves and into, perhaps, you know, government agencies that are aiding and abetting, you know, the transnational criminal organizations?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’ll stick with the pattern here and say a word or two and then let my colleague flesh out the answer.
I would say, big picture, the emphasis in this executive order is to enable the use of sanctions against the organizations as we find them today, which includes networked organizations in which enablers, financial facilitators, and other types of supporters who don’t always fit a more traditional or hierarchical structure, play key roles in sustaining criminal activity, perpetuating criminal activity, and ultimately contributing to the harms — the multifaceted harms that this problem generates in American communities and elsewhere.
So it’s precisely to get at that broader array of criminal ecosystem that this executive order is designed.
But why don’t you say a bit more on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you very much. Yeah, today’s EOs for sanctions will permit us to more readily enable the use of sanctions against individual entities across all segments of the narcotrafficking supply chain, including against certain beneficiaries of the supply chain.
You spoke of higher-ranking officials — are they open to sanctions. Well, that’s — all Treasury sanctions have — permit that flexibility to target anybody who’s involved in sanctionable activity — in this case, criminal drug trafficking activity. It would permit us to do that if we had the evidence to do that.
I think the — Colleen, the question you ask is a very good one. I’ll simply say that we intentionally designed this EO the way it is because of the unique aspect of the drug trade today, particularly synthetic opioids; its potent and addictive nature; and its ability to kill in vast numbers so quickly.
So, if I were to say anything about this EO, it is broader and more powerful and it will permit us to carry out sanctions with greater speed and effect than we have in the past.
Thank you.
Q Hi, yes. First, I think you may have answered it, but I just wanted to get a little more clarity: When you talk about nimbleness of action responding to these EOs, are you talking about comparing it also or primarily to DOJ action, which can take quite a while, versus sanctions, which has a little lower legal bar?
And secondly, doesn’t the EO 12978, which doesn’t exclude non-Colombian traffickers provide the existing authority?
Yeah, I think that’s it. Yeah, for now. It’s the only two I can remember.
Q Thank you, Ian. Good questions, both of them.
Very quickly, EO 12978 is one of our very earliest narcotic sanctions authorities, which was focused on the cartels centered in Colombia. It’s an authority that is still on the books, but we don’t use it any longer because it’s been overtaken by more powerful authorities, specifically the Kingpin Act, and today, now, this new authority we’re rolling out today.
As far as the nimbleness of this new authority, it does not require, you know, us to sanction anybody dependent on other law enforcement action, like a Department of Justice or anything like that. But it is a complementary action that we can use in tandem with Justice Department indictments, as we have done in the past.
And what we find increasingly is that sanctions is a incredibly powerful tool, and one of the predominant tools for national security. But we’re also finding that sanctions have a greater effect when they’re used in tandem with other lines of authority. And the creation of the CTOC entity, the Strategic Division, will be instrumental in doing that.
So we’re — this is a very wise strategic move that we rolled out today.
Q Hi, are you able to hear me?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, we hear you just fine.
Q Okay, great. Thank you.
I was wondering if you could talk a little bit more about — I believe you said — the five entities in China that will be the target of sanctions.
And additionally — this is not dealing with the Kingpin law, but the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 — each year, the President comes out with a major drug transit — major illicit drug producing countries list every year. And I’m wondering if you can comment on why China has not been included in the last several years.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: [Senior administration official], do you want to take the first question and, [senior administration official], maybe take the second?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Ashley, thank you. And, I’m sorry, I want to make sure that I hit the correct question — you were asking about the five entities that we will be designating today —
Q Correct.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: — based in China?
Q Yes.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Obviously, we’re not — we can’t name the specific name of those entities as yet. They’ll become public later in the afternoon.
But this was what we attempted to do — we did target a number of entities that were based in China but also in Colombia and Mexico and Brazil because we wanted to show the geographic dispersion of the sanctions. We wanted to be geographically distributed around the world to show the reach of the organizations.
But as far as specifically why China, I think it’s very simple that a lot of the precursors, the synthetic opioids, originate in China. And it was important for us to send a signal on that front.
But as far as why China has not been included in the majors list, I will defer that to other colleagues, perhaps [senior administration official].
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks. It’s a — it’s a good question.
That particular statute applies to countries that have not met their obligations and/or the producers or traffickers of cultivated or plant-based drugs, and not synthetic drugs.
Thanks.
MODERATOR: Thank you very much, everyone, for joining the call today. Really appreciate it.
As a reminder, the contents of the call are embargoed until 2:00 p.m. Eastern today.
I’ll be sending out a factsheet momentarily. And please let us know if you have any questions. Thanks, again.
END 11:34 A.M. EST
