Via Teleconference
10:05 A.M. EST
MODERATOR: Hi, everyone. Thank you so much for joining today’s call. This is Michael Feldman with the NSC press team.
I’m just going to start up top with the ground rules. Today’s call is attributed to — on background, attributed to senior administration officials and will be held under embargo until 12:30 p.m. Eastern.
Today’s call is to preview the upcoming bilateral meeting between President Biden and President Xi at the APEC Summit in Peru.
For awareness and not for attribution, today’s speakers are [senior administration official] and [senior administration official]. With that, I will turn it over to [senior administration official] to provide opening remarks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Great. Thank you so much. And thanks so much for joining today. I’m cognizant there are many news stories. I’m glad you chose to spend a bit of time with us today.
On November 16, President Biden will meet with President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China on the sidelines of the 2024 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Lima, Peru. We’ve been working towards this meeting since National Security Advisor Sullivan visited Beijing in late August. And as you’ll recall, he briefed the press at that time that we expected the two leaders to meet later this year on the margins of either APEC or G20.
This will be the third in-person meeting between the two leaders since President Biden entered into office. They previously met in Bali, in 2022, on the margins of the G20, and at Woodside, in 2023, on the margins of APEC, exactly one year and one day ago from this upcoming meeting.
The two presidents have known each other for more than a decade, dating back to when they were both vice presidents, and have spent many hours in meetings together. We expect this will be their last meeting as presidents.
With that in mind, we expect the President will use the opportunity to take stock of efforts to responsibly manage competition over the last four years, how the two countries have advanced areas of shared interest, and, even amidst deep differences and intense competition, have worked to do so.
Throughout his time in office, President Biden has emphasized the importance of responsibly managing one of the world’s most consequential relationships. And from the very beginning of this administration, four years ago, President Biden made it clear the United States would advance and protect our interests at home and abroad. And the framework of this administration’s China policy — invest, align, and compete — has remained constant over the last four years.
The President has prioritized investments and sources of U.S. strength at home, strengthened our alliances abroad, and taken commonsense measures to protect U.S. technology and national security.
As mentioned before, at the same time, the President has demonstrated that our two countries can and must manage our differences and prevent competition from veering into conflict or confrontation by maintaining open lines of communication and advancing cooperation in areas of shared interest.
I expect President Biden will want to take stock of the progress we have made in a number of areas since the Woodside Summit last year. That cooperation can be an important stabilizing force in the relationship. For example, over the last year, the two sides have resumed military-to-military communications at all levels. At the senior level, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, Secretary of Defense Austin, and the INDOPACOM commander have met or had telephone calls with their PRC counterparts over the last year.
The U.S. and the PRC also restarted the Defense Policy Coordination Talks in January of 2024 and have carried out agreed-upon defense engagements since, to include the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, MMCA, which is an operator-to-operator level talks that was just held earlier this month, and Crisis Communications and Prevention Working Group that was held in late October.
These discussions are important to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation. And for the first time this year, I should add as well, both sides pre-notified their respective ICBM launches.
President Biden has made clear and will continue to emphasize the importance of maintaining military-to-military communications at all times and especially during times of heightened tension.
On counternarcotics, another outcome of Woodside, the two sides have strengthened joint law enforcement actions and increased information sharing over the last year. Since the resumption of counternarcotics cooperation last November, the PRC has scheduled over 55 dangerous synthetic drugs and precursor chemicals, shut down dozens of online platforms and stores, and arrested hundreds of individuals involved in the illicit chemical industry.
In just the last month, the PRC has moved to arrest two different groups of individuals that were indicted in the United States, and we managed to do joint announcements on both of those. Joint but separate.
All of these steps are helping us combat the global fentanyl crisis at home and contributed to the decline in overdose deaths and disruption in the supply of illicit fentanyl that we’ve seen over the last year.
On AI, the two sides have recognized the novel risks posed by frontier AI models and have begun to have difficult but productive conversations about AI safety and risk. These discussions paved the way for the PRC at UNGA to co-sponsor the first-ever AI resolution proposed by the U.S. in March and, for later in the summer, the U.S. to co-sponsor the PRC’s AI resolution.
On climate, our countries’ envoys have also had deep and meaningful discussions over the past four years, leading to three far-ranging joint statements that have set the stage for climate commitments on greenhouse gas reductions, peak emissions, and renewable energy. Those discussions are continuing this week, of course, at COP.
Equally importantly, the President intends to use this meeting to discuss areas of difference and how to manage those differences in the period ahead. I expect the President will express deep concern over the PRC’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine, as well as the deployment of over 10,000 DPRK troops to Russia, where they have begun engaging in combat operations with Russian forces. We are increasingly concerned about the consequences for longer-term stability in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific of this deployment.
I expect the President will warn that cyber pre-positioning on civilian critical infrastructure and engaging in reckless attacks against our critical networks are unacceptable. These actions have the potential to destabilize the bilateral relationship and lead to an even broader de-risking away from PRC technology.
I expect the President will also underscore the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and express his concerns that the PRC’s increased military activities around Taiwan are destabilizing and eroding the status quo.
The President may also express concern over PRC actions in the South China Sea, including PRC coast guard actions against lawful maritime operations by other South China Sea claimant countries.
In his many conversations with President Xi, President Biden has consistently also underscored the critical importance of respect for human rights, and I expect he will do so again.
And of course, the President will also underscore his longstanding concern with the PRC’s unfair trade policies and non-market economic practices, which have over time created an unlevel playing field for American workers.
Let me pause there and see if there are any questions. Back over to you, Michael.
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. We will now take some questions. Also, just a reminder, for those of you who might have joined late, this call is under embargo until 12:30 p.m. today.
Our first question is going to go to Trevor. You should be able to unmute yourself.
Q Hi. Thanks for doing this. What will President Biden tell President Trump about managing the China relationship? And what will President Biden tell President Xi about managing Trump? Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks for the question, Trevor. I think I’ll stay far away from some specific comments on that and instead just say: Look, this is a difficult, complicated but consequential relationship. And the President has been pretty clear that even amidst the competitive aspects of the relationship, we need to find a way to manage it responsibly.
He’ll probably reflect over the last four years what we have found works in that sense. Having leader-level channel of communications are an important way to do that. The strategic channel between Director Wang and National Security Advisor Sullivan was also an important way to have difficult, low-profile conversations about the issues that matter. And then, the working-level communications — military-to-military level operators, the law enforcement back-and-forth that restarted after Woodside — these have all been critical to lending an element of stability to the relationship, even amidst the deep differences.
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Aamer. You should be able to unmute yourself.
Q Hey, thank you. How concerned is the President, going into this meeting, that the progress that’s been made in some of these areas that you’ve already enumerated are going to go to waste with the incoming administration, specifically with the promised tariffs that Trump has promised on the campaign trail?
And then secondly, can you speak to how broadly the President will speak to President Xi about these coming tariffs? Will he — in some sense, is he going to offer or, rather, ask President Xi to show some restraint himself? Thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks for the question. Look, I’ll refer you to the incoming administration for any questions on what they intend to do. We really can’t comment on that.
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Demetri.
Q Thank you. Good morning. Has the U.S. run out of time to impose sanctions on Chinese financial institutions to try and reduce Chinese support for Russia’s industrial or defense industrial base? Or will President Biden warn Xi Jinping that this is his last chance to take action to avoid U.S. sanctions on financial institutions and banks?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks for the question, Demetri. As you know, this has been a key topic of conversation in nearly — well, in every senior leader-level engagement, as well as those at the Cabinet level, between their counterparts, this concern we have about Chinese support for the Russian defense industrial base.
Over the last four years, we have rolled out hundreds of sanctions against Chinese entities. We have had ongoing conversations about where we see activity of concern. We have worked to ensure that we’re cutting off mechanisms where we can. And I think you see that reflected in some of the public statements in recent meetings between Russian and Chinese counterparts, where, you know, they are highlighting the need for better or different financial mechanisms. We are working hard to squeeze that as much as we can.
It’s not going to stop. I think that is going to be a continuing topic of conversation, not just in this bilateral meeting, but a task for the next administration as well — how we continually work to try to limit that support for the Russian defense industrial base and, by extension, the war in Ukraine.
Q Can I just ask: Have you seen any evidence that China has actually reduced its support as these other measures have been taken?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, I think we look at the trade figures between the two countries, and we do not see a reduction in the trade of concern. We have, I think, noted publicly where we have seen the PRC take actions that are more constructive public statements about no use of tactical nuclear weapons, for example, at the onset of the conflict. The decision — public and what we have seen, as well, in conversations with our other partners — no provision of lethal assistance. But still, you know, there is much more that we seek, and there are actions we’d like to see them to take. So I expect that will be part of the conversation, not just in this meeting but in others as well.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Asma. You should be able to unmute yourself.
Q Hey. Thank you, guys, for doing this. I have another question as it relates to the incoming new administration, because I think there’s a lot of curiosity on our end about that. I wanted to get a sense from you of how much continuity you see on China policy with some of the choices that the Trump administration has made in terms of sort of selections of Cabinet picks and just broad policy suggestions he has made.
And this question comes from the fact that a number of outside experts have told me that China was one area of rather broad consensus and not as much differentiation between the first Trump term and President Biden. So, I wanted to get a sense of how much continuity of policy you see. Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks for the question. I’m going to stick with the line: I can’t comment on what the next administration will or won’t do and what their policy direction will be.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Patsy.
Q Hi. Thank you for doing this. I’m going to try again. I mean, I know you’ve said over and over you can’t answer specifically on the next administration, but can you just shed a little bit of light in terms of what could the President broadly say to President Xi Jinping in terms of future managing relations, particularly on Taiwan and the South China Sea? I mean, we see, you know, the group of Trump appointees that signal some pretty hawkish positions on China. Is there anything you can say? Thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, I think the way I come at this question is: This is a tough, complicated relationship between the U.S. and China, and so whatever the next administration decides, they are going to need to find ways to manage that tough, complicated relationship.
What the President will use this meeting and what I expect he will use this meeting to do is reflect on how this administration has approached it, what we see has worked, the channels of communication, the tough, private conversations, the actions that we have still taken to defend American national security. And then, you know, the areas that I have highlighted in this conversation — Russia, cross-Strait issues, South China Sea, and cyber — are areas the next administration is going to need to think about carefully, because those are areas of deep policy difference with China, and I don’t expect that will disappear.
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Nick.
Q Hey, guys. Thanks very much. Different topic. As the President flies down to Lima, Xi Jinping is opening what will be the second-largest port, I believe, on this side of the Pacific Ocean, after Long Beach — a Chinese port in Peru. This is not a new story, but the Peruvian Ambassador told me the other day that there’s not enough U.S. investment in Peru or Latin America, and the Chinese have better offers.
Again, it’s not a new story, but do you believe the U.S. is already — or has already fallen behind when it comes to infrastructure development and Chinese influence in Latin America, given that’s where you’re going for this meeting? Thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Nick, thanks for the question and for the shift in topic as well, I should say.
Look, I think Chinese infrastructure investment overseas is not a new topic. As you point out, we’ve, in fact, seen it reduce over the last couple of years due to the challenges they’re facing both domestically but also in some of these projects overseas.
So, look, I would say this administration has focused very much on how we try to bring private investment — private sector investment to bear overseas, the important impact that can have in high standards in ensuring that the terms of agreements are such that they are contributing to host countries’ long-term stability or long-term fiscal stability. And we’ve done this through the Quad. We’ve done this through PGI, through IPEF, through APEC, through various other acronyms that I will not bore you with, but just to say that we recognize the value of investment overseas and what an important role that plays in encouraging economic (inaudible).
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Annie.
Q Hi there. Thanks for doing this. The President has spoken extensively about his relationship with Xi and the amount of time that they have spent together. Can you just reflect a little bit on what the President’s mood has been like, kind of going into this meeting, which, as you pointed out, is probably their last meeting? I mean, are they — is he a little — just, I can’t imagine — can you talk a little bit about just his mood in this moment?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, you know, without getting into specifics, I would just say that this has been and the President said publicly that he feels this is an important, consequential relationship. And his personal management, I should say as [redacted], has been important to any progress that we have made.
I think he and Xi had known each other for over a decade, have had meetings with each other for over a decade, both as vice presidents and as presidents, both in China and the United States and on the margins of these multilateral meetings. These engagements are not easy. The conversations are not easy. But as the President has said, in fact, at Woodside, they speak candidly and forthrightly to each other, and there is — that frankness has been important in managing the relationship.
I think as the President heads into this meeting, he’s going to be focused, as he has been in every other engagement, on delivering results for the American people.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Aurelia.
Q Hi. And thank you so much for taking my question. I
wanted to know: Has the incoming administration gotten any classified briefing on the relationship with China, or have they requested any?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, I think I’d refer you to the transition teams for any questions about that.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question is going to go to Phelim.
Q Hi. Good morning, everybody. Can you hear me?
MODERATOR: Yep.
Q Hi. Thanks so much. You’ve given a really good list of things that — the achievements of the administration vis-à-vis the relationship with China, the list of the outstanding issues that they’re concerned about.
My question is this: What are, like, the one or two sort of top items that President Biden would like to get some kind of agreement on that he can bring home from this meeting in APEC? It’s his last meeting with Xi. What is on his list of things he wants to get done?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks for the question, Phelim. I think, look, these meetings are different than many of the bilateral engagements. There’s not a long list of outcomes or deliverables. We did work hard at Woodside to focus in on three different issue sets — the mil-mil, counternarcotics, and the AI piece — and focused in on those small steps forward to reestablish channels to ensure that we were able to deliver results in those areas.
I think this meeting will reflect on the progress to date, and we’ll expect to try to continue to ensure that we’ve got those channels working, law enforcement and mil-mil in particular, which we see as critical to underpinning stability in the relationship in the period ahead.
MODERATOR: Thank you. Our next question will go to Michael Martina.
Q Hi. Thanks for doing this. You know, the Biden administration has made a point for a long time now that it was held in high priority the wrongfully detained. So, given that this is likely to be their last meeting, is President Biden concerned about making progress, any kind of last-ditch effort to get some of these wrongfully detained out? I’m not asking you whether that will actually happen, I guess, but whether or not the President is trying to make that happen before he leaves office. Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks so much for the question, Michael. I would — thank you, and thank you for flagging this issue.
As he has in all meetings with Xi, I expect that he will call for the release of U.S. citizens that are wrongfully detained or under exit bans in China. As you all know, that has been a personal priority of the President during his time in office.
MODERATOR: Great. Thank you very much. And thank you all today for joining. Just as a reminder, this call is on background, attributed to senior administration officials and under embargo until 12:30 p.m.
If we didn’t get to your question, please feel free to reach out to myself or the NSC press team distro, and we’ll be happy to take it. Thank you very much, and have a great rest of your day.
10:26 A.M. EST
