8:33 A.M. EDT
MODERATOR: All right, we’ll get started here. Thank you all for joining us early this morning for this background call on administration travel to China.
So everyone understands the terms of the call, we’re going to hold this call on background, attributable to a senior administration official. For awareness, but not for reporting, that senior administration official is [senior administration official].
And the call will be held under embargo until 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time, at which time I anticipate the formal announcement of the anticipated travel will go out.
So with that, I’ll hand it over to [senior administration official] for some opening remarks, and then we’ll take some questions. Thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks so much, Kate. And thanks to everyone for joining us early on a Friday morning. Quite a way to start the end of the week.
I wanted to take this opportunity just to brief you on the upcoming travel. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will travel to Beijing for meetings with PRC Foreign Minister, Communist Party Politburo Member, and Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, Wang Yi, August 27th through 29th.
This is the fifth meeting between Wang and Sullivan. This strategic channel of communication between the two has played an important role in responsibly managing competition and tensions.
First, a bit of background on this channel before I get into any details on the trip itself.
Mr. Sullivan and Director Wang met four times over the last year and a half. The first meeting was in Vienna in May of 2023, where they reestablished channels of communication and laid the groundwork for the diplomacy that then followed, including Secretary Blinken’s trip to the PRC in June of last year.
They also met in Malta in September of 2023 and in Washington in October of 2023 to prepare for the Woodside summit in San Francisco in November of that year.
Their last meeting was in January this year, in Bangkok, where they worked to advance outcomes from the Woodside summit, including resumption of mil-mil channels, counternarcotics cooperation, and the AI talks on risk and safety that were then held subsequently in Geneva a few months later.
They also discussed at that time areas of difference, as we always do, and set up a call between the two leaders that took place on April 2nd.
Each time the two have met, they have typically spent about 10 to 12 hours over two days covering bilateral issues, global regional issues, and cross-Strait issues. We expect to follow the same format in Beijing next week.
This channel between the National Security Advisor and the Director has been an important channel throughout this administration. Mr. Sullivan also met four times with Director Wang’s predecessor, Yang Jiechi.
We’ve said this before but it bears repeating that U.S. diplomacy and channels of communication do not indicate a change in approach to the PRC. This is an intensely competitive relationship. We are committed to making the investments, strengthening our alliances, and taking the common steps — commonsense steps on tech and national security that we need to take. We are committed to managing this competition responsibly, however, and prevent it from veering into conflict.
Mr. Sullivan’s trip to China next week was discussed by the two leaders at the Woodside summit last November. It is the first trip to China in this administration by a national security advisor. The last national security advisor trip to China was by Susan Rice in 2016. It is also a reciprocal trip. Director Wang visited Washington in October of last year.
As I mentioned earlier, I expect these meetings will cover roughly the same format as we have in previous rounds, discussing key issues in the U.S.-China bilateral relationship and advancing counternarcotics cooperation, military-to-military communication, and AI safety and risk discussions — all outcomes of the Woodside summit.
I expect we will also spend some time on areas of difference, as we always do. Mr. Sullivan will raise U.S. concerns about China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base, the South China Sea, and various other issues. I expect the two will also exchange views on other global issues, like DPRK, Middle East, and Burma. And I expect they will also discuss cross-Strait issues.
Let me pause there and turn back to Kate for any questions.
MODERATOR: Great. Our first question will go to Kayla Tausche with CNN. Kayla, you should be able to unmute.
Q Can you hear me?
MODERATOR: Yes, we can.
Q Great. Thank you both for doing this. Maintaining the relationship has been a goal since the outset of the administration. I’m wondering what President Biden has conveyed that he sees as unfinished business with China between now and January, and whether he’s communicated that he would see value in another bilateral meeting with President Xi.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks so much for that question. Look, I think I would phrase it less as unfinished business and more about the intensity of the competition. The challenges in the bilateral relationship mean that is a constant effort to manage those tensions and manage that competition.
So I think we’ll continue to use these high-level engagements, first, to push forward for actual, concrete outcomes on the three areas the two leaders agreed to at the last summit.
Mil-mil communications: We’ve run through the list of the ones the two agreed to, with the exception of the theater command; we’ll continue to press on that one. There are other things we can do in that mil-mil space that we think would be helpful in terms of communications and ensuring the resilience of those communications.
I think, on counternarcotics, as we all know, the fight against illicit precursor chemicals and fentanyl is also a constantly evolving trade, and so there are always things we need to push forward and work with the Chinese to try to get additional scheduling, additional law enforcement actions. We’ve seen some good action in that space over the last couple of months, including the scheduling for the first time in quite some time of three fentanyl precursors. But there’s always more we can do.
And of course, AI safety and risk is also a rapidly evolving topic that I expect the two leaders would also want to continue to discuss.
And then, aside from that, you know, Russia, Ukraine, Middle East — all of these issues require some levels of discussion between the two sides.
We’ve been clear, and I think both sides have been clear, the value in those leader-level touch points to ensure that we’re talking at the very highest levels. I would expect that to continue, and we look for opportunities to continue that through the end of the year.
MODERATOR: Okay, next we’ll go to Aamer with the AP. Aamer, you should be able to unmute.
Q Hey, thank you both. I just was hoping to get your sense of how much Jake and others who will be on this trip will be conveying to their counterparts about what or what may not be the impact of the elections here.
And to what extent can some of the things, and how high of a priority, I guess, is to solidify just some of what was
sort of pushed forward at Woodside? And how much of it can the President really solidify at this point that can’t eventually just be undone by whoever is the next president? Thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah, thanks for the question. Look, I wouldn’t tie this trip or associate it too closely with the election. That’s not the point. We’ve tried to do these Wang Yi/Jake Sullivan touch points about once a quarter. The last one was in January. We had actually tried to schedule this trip a little bit earlier, and just with the two schedules, it was hard — it was not — we were unable to land it before next week.
So, again, I would not associate it too closely with the election. I think that is always in the background in any engagement we have with foreign officials concerned about what comes next or what the transition will be like. But this meeting will be focused on the topics and the issues that we are dealing with now. There is a lot we can get done before the end of the year in terms of just managing the relationship. I think that will be the focus.
MODERATOR: Next we’ll go to Trevor Hunnicutt with Reuters.
Q Hey, good morning. Could you talk a little bit about where China is on some of these key Mideast issues, especially Gaza war and the situation with Iran? How effective have they been in pressing towards a positive resolution there? And will you be pressing them for more on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks for the question. Middle East and, of course, Iran has been a topic that has come up, I would say, pretty much every time we’ve met, even before October 7th, of course, raising concerns about Iran as well.
I think — I don’t want to characterize the Chinese position here or get into the conversations that happen behind closed doors. I think there are some shared concerns about instability, but I think it’s fair to say the two sides, U.S. and China, approach the issue very differently.
We’ll be looking to hear from them, of course, their assessment of what’s going on, the role they have been playing, or some of the talks that have happened in China on this issue set.
But again, I think we’re approaching it fundamentally from some different directions. And I think you’ve seen that play out in the press as well, with the position or their lack of condemnation on the October 7th attack.
MODERATOR: Next we’ll go to Alex Ward with the Wall Street Journal.
Q Thanks. Will you guys be going to China with some proposal of a prisoner swap perhaps? I mean, obviously, we know there’s, if my memory is correct, around 200 or so Americans, some more known than others. Are you — will you be discussing some sort of proposal for a swap and hoping to bring Americans home on this trip?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, we raise the Americans that are detained in China in every single senior-level engagement. But, no, I have no expectation of that on this trip.
MODERATOR: Next we’ll go to Patsy with VOA.
Q Hi. Thank you both for taking my call. And sorry if I missed this, but was there a specific deliverable for the visit beyond pushing what was achieved in Woodside?
And if I may: Throughout the administration and the various meetings between Jake and Wang Yi and the leaders, how would you characterize the current trajectory of U.S.-China ties? Have things improved at all since President Biden came into office? And what is the expectation or the groundwork that you expect to lay for the next administration? Thank you.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yeah. Thanks for the question. Look, I think we’re in a different point in the relationship than we were 10, 15 years ago, where we’re talking outcomes and deliverables for engagements like this.
The purpose of this strategic level of communication is really to get into details on how, on intent of poli- — our strategic intent, intent of policy, how we see different situations. It really is about clearing up misperceptions and avoiding this competition from veering into conflict more than anything else.
We have identified some areas where we think it is important and we have shown we can work together. We think this is important not just to show that, even amidst competition, that we can find constructive ways to work with each other, but it’s also important because there are some challenges that we just can’t adequately tackle without the PRC, and one of those would be the fentanyl crisis, right? China is the source of the bulk of precursor chemicals flowing towards the United States and Mexico. And so, being able to have those law enforcement-to-law enforcement conversations, disrupt through law enforcement action, work on scheduling, do information exchanges — that is critical as part of an approach to a transnational issue.
So I would frame it more in that way — that we’re diving into these difficult, tough topics, making sure no misperception, pushing forward some of the work that we have been able to get done together.
In terms of how we set up for the next administration: Look, I think we’re clear-eyed about the threat that the PRC proposes — or poses to the international order, and we expect that to be the case for the foreseeable future. Our strategy is designed to meet that challenge.
And I think what has been so successful in this administration is our China policy is not about changing China at its core, right? It’s about positioning the United States to make the investments, build the alliances we need to succeed and grow stronger. And that really is the focus here. Part of that, then, is also ensuring we’ve got open channels of communication and high-level diplomacy to manage the risks of competition.
MODERATOR: Next we’ll go to Nick Schifrin with PBS.
Q Hey there. Thank you. I want to go back to Aamer’s question and ask just a specific thing. You’re saying that the focus is not the election, nor is the timing about the election, but the Chinese will ask about the election. So, when asked if Harris would represent continuity, or when asked about Harris’s policies, will Jake engage with the Vice President’s future policies should she become president?
And while we have you, I just wanted to get your sense of Lai Ching-te so far. You know, we got an announcement this week of increased defense spending, over 7.5 percent. William Lai is in Kinmen Island today. Just wanted you, if you’re willing, to give an assessment of Lai Ching-te’s presidency so far. Thanks.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks so much for that question. On the first one, look, I — sorry. Hold on just a moment. I got another call come in. Sorry about that. I had another phone ringing.
Look, on the continuity question, I think this is, as I said, a subtext or a question, regardless of who you are meeting with, that this tends to come up right as they try to figure out our own system.
I will say — and I think you’ve seen this in the MFA briefings on the Chinese side, in some of their public comments: They are not engaging on this in any sort of meaningful way. Essentially, their line has been: This is a U.S. domestic issue; we’re not going to get involved; we’re not asking questions.
I think we won’t aim to speak for whatever administration comes next. That will be up to the next administration to determine China policy and how they intend to use some of these channels of communication. What we can speak to is how we intend to manage the balance of this administration, how we intend to manage the transition. And I think we can focus on that piece in some of the conversations.
But again, it’ll be up to the next administration and those that are national security advisor and other key foreign policy roles to decide how they carry it forward from here. We can, of course, give recommendations, but it’ll be up to them.
MODERATOR: And our last question is going to go to Lili Pike with —
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’m sorry, I think he also asked a question on Taiwan, which I neglected to answer.
Let me just, on that point — and thanks for the question. We’ve been pretty consistent, I think as you know, that the U.S. remains committed to the One China policy guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, Three Communiqués, and Six Assurances. Been clear we oppose unilateral changes to the status quo from either side. Do not support Taiwan independence. And we expect cross-Strait differences to be resolved peacefully.
I expect in these conversations next week we’re going to raise concern about the PRC’s increased military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan. These activities are destabilizing and risk escalation. And we’re going to continue to urge Beijing to engage in meaningful dialogue with Taipei.
I think, look, everything that we have seen come out of Taipei indicates that the current leadership remains committed to maintaining status quo and peace and stability. They’ve emphasized that in their public statements. So I will leave it at that and refer you to Taipei for any additional questions on travel, et cetera.
MODERATOR: Now we’ll go to Lili Pike.
Q Thank you. Just following up on Taiwan. In recent months, we’ve seen rising tensions in the Taiwan Strait, in the South China Sea. Is this strategy of increased high-level diplomacy between the U.S. and China actually working to achieve that goal of managing tensions?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you know, by its definition, I think it’s a constant process. There is no end point or achievement of the goal. It requires constant conversations on both sides. Again, our view is still that direct and meaningful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing is the only way to address these issues head on. But we, of course, as I mentioned before, expect to raise this with China.
And, look, I think you have seen in recent multilateral statements — whether it’s G7, whether it’s Quad, the trilat — the issue of cross-Strait peace and stability is one that’s increasingly being watched closely by the rest of the world. The economic impact of instability in the region would be overwhelming. And so, I think it’s clear at this point that there is a global stake in continued peace and stability and status quo.
MODERATOR: That concludes our call. Again, this call is held under an embargo until 9:00 a.m. Eastern Time, and is attributable to a senior administration official. Thank you all.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thanks so much. Have a great weekend.
8:52 A.M. EDT
